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Abstract			 Does	the	size	of	the	electoral	margin	have	any	impact	on	the	President?	Would	the	President	be	put	into	disadvantage	if	he	or	she	did	not	win	the	election	with	a	great	margin,	or	even	without	a	popular	vote	win?	I	hypothesized	that	the	electoral	margin	should	have	a	positive	correlation	with	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents	because	it	empowers	them	via	presidential	mandates	to	have	stronger	bargaining	power	in	the	legislative	process,	followed	by	timelier	and	more	effective	control	of	the	economy.	This	study	examines	this	proposition	by	examining	the	time	span	from	1892	to	2017.	I	used	different	economic	indicators	and	historical	presidential	rankings	to	measure	the	Presidents’	economic	performance.	My	results	indicate	that	there	is	no	significant	association	between	the	Presidents’	electoral	margin	and	the	performance	of	the	economy.	
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Introduction			 Donald	Trump	was	elected	as	the	45th	President	of	the	United	States	by	winning	the	Electoral	College	in	2016.	Meanwhile,	he	lost	the	popular	vote	to	Hillary	Clinton	by	almost	2.9	million	votes.1	This	outcome	prompted	me	to	wonder	if	the	loss	of	the	popular	vote	would	put	the	newly	elected	President	in	any	disadvantage	regarding	the	economic	promises	he	made	during	the	campaign.	Donald	Trump’s	presidential	campaign	emphasized	the	need	to	“Make	America	Great	Again”	as	a	direct	response	to	the	voters	who	were	discontented	with	the	status	quo.	One	of	the	central	tenants	of	his	campaign,	with	the	provocative	rhetoric,	“Make	America	Great	Again,”	was	to	improve	the	economy.		Candidate	Trump	indicated	that	this	renewal	would	occur	by	bringing	back	the	manufacturing	jobs	that	the	country	had	lost	to	developing	countries,	renegotiating	trade	agreements,	and	by	reducing	tax	rates.			 There	is	nothing	strange	about	hearing	Presidents	claiming	that	they	have	mandates	from	the	voters	to	carry	out	their	campaign	promises.		For	example,	in	part	of	the	acceptance	address	in	the	Democratic	National	Convention	in	1932,	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	(1932)	said	“You	have	nominated	me	and	I	know	it,	and	I	am	here	to	thank	you	for	the	honor.	Let	it	…	be	symbolic	that	in	so	doing	I	broke	traditions…	I	pledge	you,	I	pledge	myself	to	a	New	Deal	for	the	American	people.”	President	Obama	also	claimed	a	mandate	in	his	post-midterm-election	news	conference	in	2014,	“To	everyone	who	voted,	I	want	you	to	
																																																								1	Throughout	the	entire	history	of	the	United	States	presidential	elections,	there	have	been	only	five	cases	in		which	the	winner	of	the	election	lost	the	popular	vote:	John	Quincy	Adams	in	1824,	Rutherford	B.	Hayes	in	1876,	Benjamin	Harrison	in	1888,	George	W.	Bush	in	2000,	and	Donald	Trump	in	2016.	
		2	
know	that	I	hear	you.	To	the	two-thirds	of	voters	who	chose	not	to	participate	in	the	process	yesterday,	I	hear	you,	too”(York	2014).		 The	current	economic	performance	of	the	President	plays	an	indispensible	role	in	voters’	decision-making	process	during	elections	because	voters	rely	on	retrospective	judgments	about	the	President’s	performance	(Kramer	1983).	It	would	be	reasonable	to	think	that	the	President	would	aim	to	better	the	economy	in	order	to	secure	reelection.	While	the	President	is	running	for	office,	he	should	have	a	platform	that	could	potentially	bring	the	best	economic	outcome.	As	he	or	she	won	the	election,	the	popular	support	that	the	election	revealed	equips	the	President	with	greater	bargaining	power	during	the	legislative	process.	The	President	could	also	claim	to	have	mandates	given	by	the	voters	to	implement	his	or	her	policy	agenda.		 To	examine	whether	the	mandates	delivered	by	the	outcome	of	the	election	have	significant	influence	on	the	Presidents,	my	research	focuses	on	investigating	the	impact	of	the	electoral	margin	on	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents	by	drawing	upon	data	that	covers	a	time	span	of	120	years,	from	1892	to	2012.	My	research	is	intended	to	address	two	theoretically	crucial	questions:	1)	What	is	the	impact	of	the	electoral	margin	on	the	President’s	power	to	achieve	a	better	economic	outcome?	2)	How	strong	is	the	correlation	between	the	electoral	margin	and	economic	performance	of	the	President?		Throughout	the	paper,	I	use	the	electoral	margin	and	the	margin	of	victory	interchangeably	and	they	are	both	defined	as	the	difference	between	the	percentage	of	popular	vote	that	the	winning	candidates	gets	and	the	percentage	of	popular	vote	that	the	second-place	candidate	gets.	
		3	
		 Drawing	upon	the	discussion	in	conventional	news	media	and	academic	literature,	I	hypothesized	that	the	greater	the	electoral	margin,	the	better	the	economic	performance	of	the	President	will	be,	because	the	President	would	have	stronger	bargaining	power	in	the	legislative	process	and	have	timelier	control	of	the	economy.	I	tested	my	hypothesis	by	conducting	statistical	analysis	with	a	number	of	economic	indicators	and	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents	based	on	the	rankings	that	were	assigned	to	them	by	different	scholars.		 The	research	contributes	to	the	understanding	of	the	relationship	between	the	electoral	outcome	and	the	economic	outcome	and	also	the	relationship	between	the	people	and	the	President.	The	research	would	be	able	to	indicate	the	future	economic	conditions	simply	by	looking	at	the	electoral	outcome.	Supposedly,	the	President	who	carries	a	strong	mandate	from	the	people	would	have	a	stronger	power	in	influencing	the	economy,	followed	by	good	economic	performance.	If	the	result	does	not	turn	out	as	expected,	we	could	further	investigate	the	causes	of	it.		To	foreshadow	my	results,	I	find	that	that	there	was	no	significant	evidence	that	demonstrates	the	impact	of	the	electoral	margin	on	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents.				 				
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Literature	Review	
Presidential	Mandates			 	Presidential	mandate	is	a	claim	made	by	the	Presidents	who	believe	that	they	are	empowered	by	the	voters	to	implement	their	agendas	or	policies	based	on	the	electoral	outcome.	Dahl	(1990)	claims	that	the	electoral	outcome	of	the	presidential	election	reflects	the	wishes	of	the	majority	and	the	policies	should	prevail	in	any	conflicts	with	Congress	because	of	the	legitimacy	that	the	outcome	confers.	The	concept	of	presidential	mandate	was	utilized	by	the	Presidents	commonly,	during	the	Woodrow	Wilson	and	Ronald	Regan	administrations	in	particular	(ibid).	Conley	(2001)	formally	and	empirically	confirmed	the	claim	made	by	Dahl	by	analyzing	the	data	on	elections	and	legislations	from	1828	and	performing	case	studies	from	the	Truman	administration	to	the	Clinton	administration.	Moreover,	she	found	that	Presidents	who	won	with	greater	electoral	margins	are	more	likely	to	ask	for	major	policy	changes.		 Discussion	of	presidential	mandates	and	the	margin	of	victory	are	not	limited	within	academia.	A	wider	margin	of	victory	appears	to	be	perceived	by	the	public	as	a	tool	to	assist	the	Presidents	to	accomplish	their	agendas.	For	example,	an	article	of	the	Los	Angeles	Times	titled	“Why	Clinton’s	margin	of	victory	matters,”	discussed	that	if	Hillary	Clinton	could	win	the	election	by	a	huge	margin,	she	“would	be	able	to	claim	some	measure	of	a	popular	mandate”(McManus	2016).	The	implication	of	the	electoral	margin	was	not	limited	in	the	presidential	election	but	also	the	primary	election.	An	article	of	USA	Today,	“Clinton,	hoping	for	a	boost,	defeats	Sanders:	Ultimate	margin	of	victory	will	set	tone	for	rest	of	the	race,”	the	margin	of	victory	of	Hillary	Clinton	was	important,	
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If	it’s	a	big,	double-digit	win,	she	can	head	with	confidence	into	the	next	contests.	If	its	narrower,	it	will	point	to	additional	challenges	in	her	efforts	to	decisively	box	Sanders	out	of	the	nomination	and	unite	the	Democratic	Party”	(Przbyla	2016).	There	was	also	discussion	on	the	debate	of	the	presidential	mandate’s	power	and	whether	Reagan	had	a	mandate	(Leuchtenburg	2013;	Wilson	1981).	A	survey	conducted	by	Washington	Post-Schar	School	of	Policy	and	Government	discussed	that	Trump	has	a	margin	of	victory	that	ranks	him	46th	in	fifty-eight	elections,	in	terms	of	percent	of	electoral	vote,	and	ranks	47th	in	forty-nine	election,	in	terms	of	popular	vote	margin.	It	attributes	to	the	reason	why	only	29	percent	of	Americans	say	that	Trump	has	a	mandate	for	the	agenda	he	offered	during	the	campaign	(Patel	2016).		 Presidents	could	gather	more	support	from	the	members	of	the	Congress	based	on	the	electoral	outcome.		Roscoe	(2003)	hypothesized	that	members	of	Congress	from	the	opposite	party	should	be	more	supportive	of	the	President	from	the	opposing	political	party	when	that	President	has	greater	electoral	support	among	the	member	of	Congress’s	reelection	constituencies.	He	tested	this	hypothesis	with	data	drawn	from	the	House	of	Representatives	during	the	1980s	and	1990s.	His	findings	were	consistent	with	his	hypothesis.	Dwyer	and	Treul	(2012)	found	that	the	Senators	behave	similarly.	By	investigating	the	override	attempts	from	1973	to	2011,	Hickey	(2014)	found	that	Presidents’	strength	in	members’	constituencies	make	party	members	from	their	own	parties	more	likely	to	join	the	Presidents’	veto	override	coalitions.	Ultimately,	the	parties	are	unlikely	to	take	an	opposing	stand	when	the	government	is	trying	to	pass	a	proposal	to	generate	economic	growth	because,	unlike	other	social	issues,	economic	growth	is	“universally	approved”	by	the	public	(Weatherford	2009,	542).	Furthermore,	Presidents	
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enjoy	an	“economic	policy	honeymoon”	in	the	early	months	of	transitional	administrations	when	the	public	favorability	has	a	sharply	upward	shift	(ibid,	541).			 Despite	the	electoral	margin	being	considered	an	important	component	of	the	presidential	mandate,	its	effect	has	not	been	studied	extensively	and	it	has	rarely	been	the	main	focus	of	the	studies,	even	though	it	has	been	used	as	a	confounding	variable	(Canes-Wrone,	Brady,	and	Cogan	2002).	Nonetheless,	the	impact	of	the	electoral	margin	was	significantly	supported	by	different	studies.	Fowler	(2006)	suggested	that	the	margin	of	victory	is	correlated	with	the	leeway	the	winning	party	is	given	to	implement	more	extreme	version	of	its	policies.	He	used	the	futures	data	from	the	Iowa	Electronic	Markets	to	assess	the	impact	of	the	electoral	outcomes	on	the	financial	markets.	Post-electoral	nominal	interest	rates	were	derived	from	the	future	contracts	because	the	contracts	include	consensus	expectations	of	future	prices	and	yields	of	an	asset.	By	analyzing	the	futures	data	of	the	United	States	from	1988	to	2000,	Fowler	found	that	the	electoral	margin	has	a	significant	and	direct	impact	on	the	expectation	of	inflation	and	policy	risk.	Potter	(2013)	studied	the	relationship	between	the	electoral	margins	and	American	foreign	policy	and	he	found	that	new	Presidents	with	large	electoral	margins	are	empowered	with	more	leverage	to	better	pursue	otherwise	constrained	foreign	policies.	Potter	provided	two	reasons	to	explain	the	importance	of	electoral	margin	as	an	indicator	to	reflect	the	Presidents’	true	popular	support	and	presidential	power	in	the	beginning	of	the	administrations	(p.	506).	First,	instead	of	the	polling	that	is	done	during	the	presidential	term,	an	electoral	margin	represents	the	people	who	have	voted.	Thus,	it	conveys	voters’	preferences	and	Presidents’	popularities	based	on	the	presidential	campaigns.	Second,	
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disproportionately,	Presidents’	agendas	are	set	in	the	beginning	of	the	term	and	they	convey	the	Presidents’	political	strength	indicated	by	the	electoral	outcome.			 McCann	(2005)	found	that	there	is	a	correlation	between	the	electoral	margin	and	the	greatness	of	the	Presidents	from	1824	to	1996	by	using	the	Simple	Method.	Winners	with	high	margin	of	victory	in	years	of	public	purpose	and	winners	with	low	margin	of	victory	in	years	of	private	interests	will	result	in	an	above	average	greatness	rating.	Private	interest	years	were	classified	as	the	time	period	where	the	predominant	view	of	the	public	was	to	solve	societal	problems	by	increasing	privatization	and	free	market	economic	principles.	Public	interest	years	were	classified	as	the	time	period	where	the	predominant	view	was	to	improve	the	society	via	the	involvement	of	idealism,	passion,	political	commitment,	and	social	change.	The	Simple	Method	is	a	calculation	developed	by	McCann	that	is	used	to	perform	analysis	on	minimal	data	that	is	available	shortly	after	an	election.	It	serves	as	an	alternative	to	the	complex	regression	equations	that	other	scholars	use.	The	greatness	used	in	McCann’s	study	is	measured	by	Ridings	and	McIver	(1997),	according	to	five	categories:	accomplishments	and	crisis	management,	appointments,	character	and	integrity,	leadership	qualities,	and	political	skills	(p.	VIII).	However,	McCann	did	not	study	the	effect	of	the	electoral	margin	on	any	specific	areas	nor	do	we	know	if	there	are	certain	aspects,	for	example,	economy	or	foreign	policy,	that	are	more	sensitive	to	the	electoral	margin.	His	study	is	limited	to	only	producing	dichotomous	“above	average”	or	“below	average”	predictions	instead	of	a	scaled	continuous	prediction,	and	the	categorization	of	an	election	year	as	one	of	public	purpose	or	private	interests	may	be	“somewhat	problematic,”	because	the	categorization	of	the	year	was	subjective	(McCann	2005,	296).	
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	 Drawing	upon	the	discussion	above,	the	effect	and	significance	of	the	electoral	margin	is	recognized	by	both	scholars	and	the	public.	Larger	electoral	margins	empower	Presidents	with	mandates	to	obtain	stronger	bargaining	power	in	the	legislative	process.	By	doing	so,	the	Presidents	are	more	likely	to	be	able	to	implement	policies	according	to	the	agendas	preferred	by	the	voters.	
Economic	Performance	of	the	Presidents		
	 Economic	performance	of	a	President	is	referred	to	as	the	outcome	of	the	economy	attributed	to	the	President.	A	President	is	considered	to	have	good	economic	performance	if	the	economy	is	in	good	shape	beyond	his	or	her	presidential	term,	because	the	lagging	effect	should	also	be	taken	into	account.	Although	the	public	holds	the	performance	of	the	Presidents	accountable,	they	often	times	omitted	the	constraints	that	the	Presidents	have	over	the	economy	(Kane	2016).	For	example,	Gunzinger	and	Sturm	(2016)	found	that	the	size	of	2009	fiscal	stimulus	package	endorsed	by	President	Obama	was	limited	due	to	the	effect	of	political	constraints	in	the	Great	Recession.	Stimulus	packages	implemented	by	the	governments	that	did	not	have	political	constraints	were	about	1	to	2.7	percentage	points	Gross	Domestic	Product	larger	in	size	than	the	governments	that	faced	political	constraints	(ibid,	585).	Political	constraints	include	the	partisan	composition	of	Congress,	checks	and	balances,	electoral	rules,	and	federalism	(Beck	et	al.	2001,	171-177).	The	constraint	during	the	implementation	of	the	stimulus	package	in	2009	occurred	due	to	the	Democratic	Party’s	internal	disputes	and	pressure	from	the	public	(Gunzinger	and	Sturm	2016,	592).	Bond	and	Fleisher	(2013),	by	analyzing	the	presidential	success	on	congressional	roll	call	votes	from	1953	through	1984,	obtained	similar	results	on	the	constraint	imposed	by	the	partisan	composition	of	Congress.	
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	 In	contrast,	Bohte	and	Heo	(2013)	found	that	constraints	do	not	necessarily	prohibit	the	Presidents	from	implementing	fiscal	policy	that	could	have	significant	economic	effects	because	of	the	power	that	the	Presidents	have	on	controlling	deficit	spending	and	influencing	tax	policies.	They	also	found	that	the	total	government	expenditure	did	not	have	a	significant	impact	on	economic	growth	or	unemployment	(ibid,	50).	The	greatest	leeway	exercised	by	Presidents	is	in	fiscal	policy	and	their	ability	to	make	longer-run	policies	(Weatherford	2009).	
Voting	Behavior				 Due	to	the	importance	of	the	economy	to	the	citizens	and	voters’	view	on	accountability,	voters	are	likely	to	take	the	potential	performance	of	the	President	into	account	during	evaluation	process.	For	a	very	long	time,	scholars	have	been	arguing	about	the	economic	voting	behavior	of	the	public.	The	retrospective	model	describes	voters	who	hold	the	government	responsible	for	recent	past	and	present	economic	performance	and	punish	or	reward	the	incumbent	government	with	their	votes	(Lewis-Beck	and	Stegmaier	2000;	Fiorina	1981).	The	prospective	model,	also	known	as	the	rational	expectation	theory,	suggests	that	voters	desire	to	vote	for	the	most	competent	candidates	who	could	potentially	bring	the	best	economic	outcomes	(Duch	and	Stevenson	2011).		 Voters	take	into	consideration	different	factors	in	order	to	evaluate	the	performance	of	the	candidates,	such	as	different	policy	agendas.	In	particular,	voters	weigh	economic	issues	more	heavily	than	others	(Lewis-Beck	and	Stegmaier	2000).	Hence,	the	economic	fluctuation	significantly	affects	the	outcomes	of	the	elections.	The	Downsian	theory	argues	that	voters	are	rational	beings	that	are	future	oriented	–	they	make	their	decisions	based	
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on	the	utility	income	which	is	the	benefits	that	they	expect	to	get	from	the	related	government	activity	(Downs	1957,	36).			 The	Downsian	model	is	built	around	the	notion	that	voters	are	rational	beings.	However,	scholars	did	not	obtain	consistent	results	to	prove	that	voters	are	rational.	While,	some	scholars	found	that	voters	are	rational,	some	had	shown	that	voters	are	“rationally	irrational”	or	even	irrational	(Eubank	1986;	Hansen,	Palfrey	and	Rosenthal	1987;	Caplan	2001;	Downs	1957).	Downs	(1957)	admitted	that	voters	have	rational	ignorance,	which	means	that	voters	often	ignore	or	do	not	know	the	drawbacks	of	the	policies	because	they	do	not	possess	enough	economic	knowledge.	Rational	ignorance	resulted	from	voter’s	perception	of	low	return	on	the	possession	of	such	knowledge	rather	than	their	unwillingness	to	pay	efforts	to	learn	(253).			 Caplan	(2007),	one	of	the	most	prominent	scholars	in	studying	irrational	voters,	pointed	out	that	voters	are	ignorant	about	politics	and	they	are	even	irrational.	In	particular,	voters’	beliefs	about	economics	are	systematically	mistaken	and	their	views	differ	largely	from	the	economists.		The	irrational	voting	behavior	led	to	the	failure	of	democracy	and	the	persistent	delivery	of	bad	policies	(ibid).	Quite	contrary	to	the	Downsian	theory,	evaluations	of	candidates	do	not	solely	depend	on	the	candidates’	agendas.	For	example,	Coffé	and	Theiss-Morse	(2016)	found	that	the	occupational	background	of	the	candidates	influences	voters’	perceptions	of	their	competence	to	handle	issues	and	voters’	support,	as	reflected	by	the	survey	experiment	conducted	on	college	students.	Some	voters,	instead	of	choosing	candidate	based	on	his	or	her	policy	choice,	choose	the	candidate	with	preferred	personality,	even	if	the	candidate	would	likely	to	bring	lower	utility	payoff	(Gul	and	Wolfgang	2009).	
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	 Scholars	have	found	mixed	evidence	on	whether	some	voters	are	ignorant	or	unsophisticated	when	they	choose	their	preferred	candidate.	Martinelli	(2005)	found	that	when	the	acquisition	of	information	is	costly,	voters	behave	like	the	“rationally	ignorant	voters’	described	by	Downs.	In	contrast,	if	the	cost	of	information	is	near	zero,	voters	are	consistent	with	a	well-informed	electorate.	Meanwhile,	Feddersen	and	Sandroni	(2006)	found	that	a	small	fraction	of	voters	remained	uninformed	even	if	the	cost	to	acquire	information	is	negligible.	Furthermore,	those	voters	may	vote	against	the	candidate	with	strongest	partisan	support.			 Chappell	and	Keech	(1991)	found	that	voters	are	sophisticated	in	evaluating	economic	performance	of	the	incumbent	President	and	can	predict	the	future	performance.	A	sophisticated	voter	would	“reward	incumbents	for	selecting	desirable	policies	even	when	times	are	bad	and	punish	them	only	for	those	undesirable	outcomes	for	which	they	could	reasonably	be	held	responsible”(ibid,	210).	Nevertheless,	some	voting	behaviors	were	less	sophisticated	or	unsophisticated.	In	spite	of	the	critique	of	the	rational	voting	theory,	Suzuki	&	Chappell	(1996)	were	not	able	to	find	evidence	to	reject	the	theory	based	on	the	post-World	War	II	data.	Moreover,	Suzuki	&	Chappell	found	that	voters	are	more	sensitive	to	permanent	rather	than	cyclical	economic	growth.	They	also	found	that	marginal	voters’	awareness	of	economic	constraints	is	reflected	by	the	electoral	outcome	with	an	implication	of	preference	of	long	term	economic	well-being	(ibid,	235).	Based	off	the	case	study	on	the	behavior	of	voters	with	different	degree	of	understanding	on	insurance	reform,	Lupia	(1994)	suggested	that	although	many	voters	are	ignorant,	there	are	shortcuts	for	them	to	vote	as	though	they	were	well	informed	because	of	the	availability	of	information	cues.	Furthermore,	people’s	capacities	for	informed	decision-making	is	likely	
		12	
to	be	underestimated	because	the	conventional	survey	was	not	able	to	capture	the	respondents’	political	knowledge	(Prior	and	Lupia	2008).	However,	a	concern	is	raised	because	voters	frequently	have	biases	in	attribution	of	responsibility	for	political	actors	and	outcomes.	This	undermines	retrospective	voting	as	a	tool	to	offset	voter	ignorance	(Caplan,	Crampton	and	Somin	2013).		 The	existing	literature	has	been	mostly	focusing	on	how	does	the	economic	performance	of	the	incumbent	government,	the	political	business	cycle,	and	the	current	economic	condition	affect	voters’	choice	(De	Ferrari	2015;	Kramer	1983;	MacKuen,	Erikson	and	Stimson	1992).	The	political	business	cycle	refers	to	the	fluctuations	of	the	economy	resulting	from	the	intervention	of	political	actors,	such	as	the	Federal	Reserve.	Even	though	voters	and	Presidents	are	interdependent	and	constantly	influencing	each	other,	a	question	has	not	been	discussed	extensively–	how	do	the	voters	influence	the	government	and	the	economy,	if	they	could.	My	research	studies	voters’	influence	on	the	economic	performance	of	the	President	via	electoral	outcome.	This	research	fills	the	knowledge	gap	within	this	field	and	examines	the	conventional	wisdom	about	the	presidential	mandates.	The	primary	focus	is	to	understand	whether	the	larger	support	of	the	voters	would	give	the	President	stronger	power	that	would	lead	to	better	economic	performances.		
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Theory			 I	propose	that	there	is	a	positive	relationship	between	the	margin	of	victory	and	the	economic	performance	of	the	President.	The	explanation	of	the	theory	is	split	into	two	parts:	1)	the	margin	of	victory	empowers	the	Presidents	with	stronger	bargaining	power	and	timelier	control	on	the	economy;	2)	Presidents	have	a	strong	incentive	to	achieve	good	economic	performance	and	realize	their	agendas	because	the	margin	signifies	the	size	of	the	public	that	will	hold	them	accountable.		 The	margin	of	victory	signifies	the	support	from	the	voters	and	it	provides	support	to	the	President	because	it	represents	the	number	of	people	who	can	plausibly	be	said	to	prefer	his	or	her	agenda	to	the	other	candidates.’	It	is	seen	as	the	most	powerful	indicator	of	the	political	strength	that	the	Presidents	possess	because	it	reveals	the	official	count	of	mobilized	voters	instead	of	sample	surveys,	which	merely	provides	a	snapshot	of	the	population	(Potter	2013,	506).	The	empowerment	by	the	public	lowers	the	opposition	to	the	bills	that	the	Presidents	advocate	for	because	the	Members	of	Congress	are	discouraged	from	voting	against	the	will	of	their	constituents.	(Roscoe	2003;	Dwyer	and	Treul	2012;	Ponder	2012).	The	Presidents	are	also	able	to	receive	stronger	support	from	their	affiliated	political	party	in	the	legislative	process	(Hickey	2014;	Sulkin,	Testa	and	Usry	2015).	Popular	Presidents	can	direct	Congress’	attention	to	the	topics	that	they	most	emphasized	and	they	can	implement	policies	that	are	relatively	closer	to	their	own	ideologies	(Lovett,	Bevan	and	Baumgartner	2015;	Ponder	2012).	Because	of	such	power	that	the	Presidents	acquired,	I	construe	that	the	Presidents	would	have	stronger	bargaining	power	in	the	legislative	process	and	they	would	be	able	to	efficiently	implement	policies	that	are	on	the	agendas	or	would	be	beneficial	to	the	public.	In	particular,	they	would	have	a	better	and	
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more	responsive	control	of	the	economy.	The	effect	of	the	presidential	mandates	is	strengthened	when	the	same	political	party	controls	the	Congress	and	presidency	because	they	would	have	less	incentive	to	compromise	and	less	time	would	be	spent	on	negotiation	with	the	opposition	parties.		 Second,	since	Presidents	with	a	greater	electoral	margin	are	held	accountable	to	more	voters	because	they	are	elected	by	a	larger	population,	he	or	she	will	have	even	stronger	motivation	to	implement	policies	that	aim	to	bring	about	the	best	economic	outcomes,	especially	because	voters	weigh	economic	issues	more	heavily	than	any	other	issues	(Lewis-Beck	and	Stegmaier	2000).	Similar	to	the	MCs,	Presidents	are	also	subject	to	reelection	considerations,	although	they	face	only	one	additional	reelection	campaign	after	their	first	term	in	office.	Therefore,	retaining	a	high	approval	rating	of	the	public	is	essential	to	him	or	her.	Otherwise,	the	President	risks	not	being	reelected.	Presidents	have	the	incentive	to	perform	well,	even	if	they	are	not	eligible	for	reelection,	because	their	performances	affect	the	electoral	outcome	of	their	own	political	parties	(Light	1991).	Although	it	appears	that	Presidents	have	used	different	methods	to	attract	and	gain	the	approval	of	their	constituents,	few	have	been	effective	(Simonds	and	Ostrom	1989).	Domestic	policy	has	a	critical	impact	on	the	reputation	of	the	Presidents	(Light	1991).	The	study	done	by	McAvoy	revealed	that	the	impact	of	economic	policy	evaluation	on	presidential	approval	stays	consistent	over	the	time	period	from	1976	to	2002	(2006).	Even	though	Presidents	are	constrained	by	other	factors	in	the	government,	they	have	significant	roles	in	implementing	fiscal	policies	that	affect	the	economy	(Bohte	and	Heo	2013).	Thus,	the	most	important	way	to	gain	approval	from	the	voters	would	be	to	implement	good	domestic	policies,	economic	policies	in	particular.		With	a	larger	margin	of	
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victory,	I	hypothesize	that	they	would	have	a	stronger	control	in	implementing	such	policies.																				
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Hypothesis			 Drawing	upon	the	previous	discussion	of	the	power	that	the	margin	of	victory	carries	in	the	form	of	presidential	mandate,	and	Presidents’	accountability,	my	central	argument	is	that	the	larger	the	electoral	margin	by	which	a	President	wins	in	the	election,	the	better	the	economy	will	do	under	the	President’s	stewardship.	With	a	relatively	larger	electoral	margin,	the	President	should	be	able	to	achieve	better	economic	performance	because	he	or	she	would	have	better	control	of	the	economy.	In	the	case	of	the	Great	Recession,	theoretically,	with	a	larger	electoral	margin,	the	President	would	be	able	to	implement	a	sufficiently	large	stimulus	package	that	helps	the	economy	to	recover.	In	contrast,	with	a	relatively	smaller	electoral	margin,	the	President	would	be	hindered	by	the	opposition	parties	and	would	have	to	spend	more	time	on	negotiations	and	making	compromise.	Thus,	he	or	she	would	have	less	control	on	the	economy	or	the	handling	of	the	economy	would	be	less	timely.	Due	to	the	constraints	imposed	by	other	political	actors,	the	economic	performance	of	the	President	would	be	relatively	worse	compared	to	a	President	who	is	supported	by	a	relatively	larger	electoral	margin.		 To	evaluate	the	validity	of	the	central	argument,	several	sub-hypothesis	are	proposed,	which	are	the	followings:	
H1:	There	is	a	strong	positive	relationship	between	the	margin	by	which	a	President	wins	an	election	and	the	overall	economic	performance	of	the	President.	
H1.1:	There	is	a	strong	positive	relationship	between	the	margin	by	which	a	President	wins	an	election	and	the	real	GDP	growth.	
H1.2:	There	is	a	strong	negative	relationship	between	the	margin	by	which	a	President	wins	an	election	and	the	unemployment	rate.	
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H1.3:	There	is	a	strong	positive	relationship	between	the	margin	by	which	a	President	wins	an	election	and	the	growth	of	the	consumer	bundle	values.	
H1.4:	There	is	a	strong	positive	relationship	between	the	margin	by	which	a	President	wins	an	election	and	the	growth	of	the	stock	market	value.	
H1.5:	There	is	a	strong	positive	relationship	between	the	margin	by	which	a	President	wins	an	election	and	the	economic	performance	of	the	President	from	a	historical	perspective.		 H1	represents	my	general	claim	that	the	electoral	margin	is	positively	correlated	to	the	overall	economic	performance	of	the	President.	Several	conventional	economic	indicators	that	include	real	GDP,	unemployment,	value	of	consumer	bundle	values,	and	stock	market	performance	are	used	to	measure	economic	performance.	H1.1-1.4	are	sub-hypotheses	of	H1	and	they	are	used	to	measure	different	aspects	of	the	macro	economy.		 However,	the	sub-hypotheses	certainly	do	not	cover	the	entirety	of	the	economy.	In	the	meantime,	this	project	is	only	focusing	on	the	ends,	which	is	the	performance	of	the	economy,	instead	of	investigating	the	effect	of	the	electoral	margin	on	the	legislative	process.	Even	if	the	hypothesis	is	confirmed	by	the	economic	performance,	it	could	be	falsifiable	because	my	project	did	not	look	at	the	legislative	process.	Thus,	the	ends	may	have	resulted	from	factors	other	than	the	power	that	the	Presidents	obtain	from	the	electoral	margin.	Meanwhile,	Light	(1991)	suggested	that	public	opinion	and	electoral	margin	have	threshold	effects	on	legislative	and	congressional	success	of	the	Presidents.	As	long	as	the	President	remains	at	a	certain	level	of	approval,	public	support	may	not	have	significant	impact	on	his	congressional	support.	The	electoral	margin	has	a	similar	but	more	“clouded”	relationship	(ibid,	29).	I	agree	with	Light	because	the	electoral	margin	is	certainly	not	the	sole	factor	that	influence	the	power	given	to	the	Presidents.	It	has	to	work	
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with	other	factors	such	as	the	turnout	of	the	election	and	the	perceived	legitimacy	of	the	political	system	(Cavanagh	1981).	Nonetheless,	this	research	provides	a	framework	for	conducting	further	research	to	examine	the	relationship	between	the	electoral	margin	and	the	economy.		
Dependent	Variables		
	 Economic	performance	can	be	defined	as	the	assessment	of	the	President’s	success	in	dealing	with	the	economy	that	includes	the	health	of	the	economy,	employment	opportunities,	the	debt	of	the	government,	the	wealth	of	citizens,	and	even	social	justice.	Economic	performance	not	only	covers	how	the	President	performed	during	his	term,	but	also	the	long	lasting	effects	that	have	resulted	from	the	decisions	he	or	she	made,	because	some	of	the	policies	implemented	may	not	have	immediate	effects	on	the	economy	or	are	intended	for	long-term	impact.			 Although,	including	as	many	economic	indicators	as	possible	allows	for	the	comprehensive	coverage	of	different	aspects	of	the	economy,	the	study	is	constrained	by	the	availability	of	data	because	of	the	long	time	span	that	I	am	trying	to	cover.	Thus,	as	a	complement,	I	used	data	sets	that	include	different	indicators	and	algorithms	to	add	reliability	and	diversity	to	the	measurement	in	order	to	capture	different	aspects	of	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents.		 	
Overall	Economic	Performance.		The	first	set	of	data	is	from	Taylor	(2012).	Taylor	is	a	public	policy	professor	who	is	interested	in	investigating	the	relationship	between	the	presidency	and	the	economic	performance	of	the	United	States.	He	constructed	the	relative	economic	ranking	of	the	
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Presidents	in	the	United	States,	from	George	Washington	to	GW	Bush,	with	a	data-based	approach.	He	constructed	the	base	measure	of	economic	performance	by	combing	different	economic	indicators.	Then,	he	employed	various	algorithms	and	accounted	for	consistency	to	assign	as	an	overall	grade	for	each	administration,	similar	to	students’	grade	assignment,	from	4	–	0	points.	Therefore,	the	grade	represents	how	well	the	administration	did	relative	to	the	others.	The	ranking	takes	into	account	partisan	or	ideological	subjectivity	and	eliminated	personal	political	biases	from	the	study.	Even	so,	the	ranking	criteria	were	matched	with	the	popular	preferences	of	the	American	public.	The	popular	consent	of	a	good	economy	should	consist	of	the	followings:	1)	increase	in	national	wealth;	2)	reduction	in	unemployment;	3)	minimization	of	inflation;	4)	reduction	of	the	balance	of	payments	burden.	The	variables	included	in	the	study	are	economic	growth,	unemployment,	inflation,	government	debt,	balance	of	payments,	income	inequality,	currency	strength,	interest	rates,	and	stock	market	returns.		 Although	Taylor’s	ranking	is	comprehensive,	it	is	limited	to	measuring	only	the	immediate	effect	of	the	Presidents’	economic	performance.	It	neglected	the	long-term	effect	of	the	policies	implemented.	To	address	this	shortcoming,	I	use	the	second	data	set,	C-Span’s	Presidential	Historian	Survey	to	demonstrate	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents	from	a	historical	perspective	(National	Cable	Satellite	Corporation	2017).	It	measures	several	different	qualities	of	presidential	leadership,	which	includes	“public	persuasion,	“crisis	leadership”,	and	“performance	within	the	context	of	his	times.”	My	study	only	derives	the	presidents’	“economic	management.”	This	survey	is	distributed	to	historians	and	other	professional	observers	of	the	presidency,	selected	by	two	history	professors	and	a	presidential	historian.	Then	Professor	Robert	X.	Browning	analyzed	this	
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information.	One	of	the	features	of	this	survey	is	that	it	is	conducted	once	every	few	years	and	is	updated	with	new	presidency,	so	that	the	latest	perception	of	the	Presidents’	economic	performance	would	be	taken	into	account	to	the	survey.	Due	to	its	subjective	nature	and	the	ranking	is	based	on	the	comparison	between	the	Presidents,	the	ranking	is	likely	to	fluctuate	depending	on	ideological	changes	in	public	opinion.	To	minimize	the	shortcomings,	I	will	include	results	of	all	three	available	years	that	the	survey	was	conducted,	which	are	2000,	2009,	and	2017.			 	
Real	GDP	Growth.		Real	gross	domestic	product	(real	GDP)	is	the	inflation-adjusted	value	of	the	goods	and	services	produced	by	labor	and	property	located	in	a	country.	The	real	GDP	growth	refers	to	the	changes	of	the	real	GDP	from	one	quarter	to	the	last.	Real	GDP	is	a	more	accurate	economic	indicator	than	the	nominal	GDP	because	it	accounts	for	the	changes	in	price	level,	inflation,	and	currency	rate	fluctuations.	A	real	GDP	growth	shows	that	the	economy	is	expanding	which	includes	the	increase	of	personal	consumption,	business	investment,	and	government	spending.	If	the	electoral	margin	in	large,	the	President	should	have	better	control	at	the	economic	policy.	For	instance,	President	can	stimulate	the	economy	with	a	larger	financial	package	during	recessions	(Gunzinger	and	Sturm	2016).	Also,	President	can	negotiate	trading	agreements	with	foreign	countries	with	less	opposition	from	the	Congress	to	attract	overseas	investment.	Hence,	the	electoral	margin	should	have	a	positive	relationship	with	the	real	GDP	growth.		
Unemployment	Rate	Change.	
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	 Unemployment	rate	is	the	percentage	of	labor	force	that	is	jobless	and	actively	looking	for	a	job.	A	good	economic	performance	should	have	a	relatively	low	unemployment	rate	because	businesses	are	employing	more	workers	to	produce	goods.	Businesses	hire	more	workers	only	when	the	businesses	are	optimistic	about	the	business	environment	and	the	business	growth.	Moreover,	as	Presidents	with	larger	electoral	margins	enjoy	greater	power	in	policy	implementation,	they	can	create	more	labor	market	policies	to	combat	unemployment.	The	drawback	from	using	the	unemployment	rate	is	that	discouraged	workers	who	no	longer	are	looking	for	jobs	are	not	counted	in	the	statistic.	Therefore,	the	unemployment	rate	may	not	accurately	reflect	the	real	unemployment	situation.			
Consumer	Bundle	Values	Growth.		 Consumer	bundle	value	is	the	average	annual	expenditures	of	consumer	units	and	it	is	seen	as	one	of	the	measures	of	inflation.	According	to	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics,	the	value	reflects	spending	patterns	of	all	urban	consumers,	and	urban	wage	earners	and	clerical	workers	(U.S.	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	2018).	Some	examples	of	the	goods	and	services	measured	by	the	consumer	bundle	values	are	housing,	apparel,	food	and	beverages,	and	education	and	communication.	A	drawback	of	using	the	consumer	bundle	value	as	an	economic	indicator	is	that	it	does	not	reflect	the	spending	patterns	of	those	who	live	in	rural	or	nonmetropolitan	areas.	Presidents	who	receive	larger	electoral	margins	should	lead	to	the	growth	of	consumer	bundle	value	because	he	or	she	is	able	to	create	an	environment	where	people	are	more	willing	to	spend	money.	This	generates	economic	growth	and	demonstrates	the	public’s	optimism	on	the	economy.		
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Stock	Market	Value	Growth.		 The	stock	market	is	the	place	where	individuals	and	organizations	invest	in	companies	and	purchase	a	share	of	ownership	of	the	company.	The	stock	market	is	an	economic	indicator	that	reflects	how	well	the	listed	companies	are	performing	and	whether	investors	are	optimistic	about	the	economy	and	the	future.	Stock	market	growth	is	associated	with	the	expansion	of	business	cycle.	It	illustrates	both	the	industrial	and	consumer	confidence.	A	larger	electoral	margin	should	enable	the	President	to	stimulate	stock	market	growth	by	implementing	business-friendly	policies	that	are	beneficial	to	the	earnings	of	the	corporations.	Whilst,	the	President	has	relatively	little	control	on	the	stock	market	performance,	the	implication	and	the	significance	of	the	electoral	margin	has	impact	on	businesses	and	investors	to	achieve	stock	market	growth.	The	power	entrusted	to	the	President	from	the	electoral	margin,	could	demonstrate	the	political	stability	and	the	anticipation	of	better	economy	that	are	essential	to	the	industrial	investment,	particularly	from	the	foreign	businesses.	Therefore,	the	stock	market	growth	would	be	higher	if	the	Presidents	receive	larger	electoral	margins.	
Independent	Variable		
	 Electoral	margin,	also	known	as	the	margin	of	victory,	in	an	election	is	defined	as	the	difference	between	the	percentage	of	vote	that	the	winning	candidate	gets	and	the	percentage	of	vote	that	the	second	place	candidate	gets.	The	electoral	margin	would	be	a	negative	number	if	the	President	wins	the	Electoral	College	but	not	the	general	popular	vote.	
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	 The	presidential	election	data	is	drawn	from	the	American	Presidency	Project	(Peters	2018).	It	includes	the	number	of	the	popular	vote	of	every	election	from	1824.	The	scope	of	this	study	covers	the	time	period	from	Grover	Cleveland’s	second	term,	election	year	of	1892,	to	the	end	of	Barack	Obama’s	second	term,	election	year	of	2016.	Availability	of	data	was	the	main	reason	for	the	selection	of	this	time	period.	The	latest	Trump	administration	is	not	included	in	the	study	because	the	presidential	term	is	not	yet	completed.	It	is	impossible	to	measure	the	impact	of	the	economic	policies	during	his	presidential	term.		I	derived	the	electoral	margin	from	the	“popular	vote	advantage”	at	the	website.	In	the	study,	I	am	studying	the	economic	performance	of	each	presidential	term	instead	of	each	President	because	the	electoral	margin	of	the	reelection	should	also	have	impact	of	on	the	power	that	the	President	receives.	If	we	only	study	the	economic	performance	of	each	President,	we	would	only	be	studying	the	impact	of	the	first	electoral	margin	but	overlooking	the	margin	of	the	reelection.	Hence,	each	presidential	term	is	treated	as	a	separate	observation.	When	the	candidate	did	not	win	by	popular	vote,	such	as	the	2000	election,	the	electoral	margin	would	be	negative.		
Confounding	Variables			 Several	confounding	variables	are	discussed	here.	All	variables,	except	the	voter	turnout,	are	treated	as	dummy	variables	in	the	statistical	analysis	process	to	account	for	their	potential	effect	on	the	results.		 	
Affiliated	Party.		
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Political	parties	have	different	approaches	to	the	economy.	The	Democratic	approach	is	typically	associated	with	raising	taxes	and	regulating	the	market,	whilst	the	Republican	approach	is	often	associated	with	a	belief	in	lower	taxes	and	a	mostly	unfettered	free	market	economy.	Hence,	the	impact	of	their	policies	would	have	different	effects	on	the	economic	indicators.	Throughout	history,	Democratic	Presidents	had	better	economic	performance	than	the	Republican	Presidents		--	the	economic	growth	was	higher	and	unemployment	is	lower	(Comiskey	and	Marsh	2012).	Therefore,	the	party	that	the	Presidents	are	affiliated	with	would	be	taken	into	account	in	the	statistical	analysis	process.	Democratic	Presidents	are	coded	as	0	and	Republican	Presidents	are	coded	as	1.	
	 	
After	World	War	II.		The	economy	of	the	United	States	increased	dramatically	after	World	War	II	and	established	its	role	as	a	hegemon	in	the	world.	In	particular,	the	stock	market	grew	rapidly.	For	example,	from	1940	to	2004	the	Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average	(DJIA)	increased	from	130.57	to	10729.43.	In	comparison,	during	1892	and	1940,	the	DJIA	increased	from	39.4	to	130.57	only.	The	data	of	the	historical	DJIA	level	is	derived	from	the	MeasuringWorth.2	Presidential	terms	after	the	World	War	II	are	coded	1	and	the	ones	before	the	World	War	II	are	coded	0.	
	 	
	
Warfare.			
																																																								2	Website:	https://www.measuringworth.com	
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Ongoing	wars	have	different	impact	on	the	economy.	When	the	nation	is	in	war,	the	GDP	would	likely	rise	because	of	the	increase	of	government	expenditure	on	military	weapons	and	national	security.	Meanwhile,	the	public	would	be	less	interested	in	spending	on	goods	because	of	the	worries	and	pessimism	associated	with	warfare.	Also,	the	stock	market	would	have	high	fluctuations	because	investors	are	concern	about	their	investments.	They	are	highly	sensitive	to	the	political	environment	and	prefer	having	high	predictability	in	the	investing	country.		Although	there	is	not	a	clear	line	that	could	inform	us	which	wars	significantly	influence	the	economy,	in	this	project,	I	controlled	for	the	wars	that	cost	more	than	1%	GDP	in	peak	year	of	war.	Wars	included	are	as	followings:	Spanish	American	War,	World	War	I,	World	War	II,	Korean	War,	Vietnam	War,	Total	Post-9/11	wars.	The	data	of	the	cost	of	the	wars	comes	from	a	report	published	by	the	Congressional	Research	Service	(Daggett	2010).	Presidential	terms	with	warfare	are	coded	1.		
	 	
Change	of	Affiliated	Party.		Since	different	political	parties	have	different	handling	of	the	economy,	when	the	affiliated	party	of	the	Presidents	is	shifted,	the	direction	of	the	economic	policy	is	likely	to	shift	as	well.	Due	to	the	change	of	direction,	the	impact	of	the	economic	policy	would	take	a	relatively	longer	time	to	take	effect,	compared	to	the	Presidents	who	follow	the	same	direction	of	their	predecessors.	Meanwhile,	because	of	the	shift	of	political	party,	the	new	Presidents	should	have	an	even	stronger	incentive	and	make	better	use	of	their	mandates	to	implement	policies.	Hence,	the	change	of	affiliated	party	should	have	a	remarkable	impact	on	the	economy.	If	the	new	President	who	takes	over	the	office	belongs	to	a	
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different	political	party	from	his	or	her	predecessor,	his	or	her	presidential	term	is	coded	as	1.		
	 	
Status	of	the	Economy.		If	there	were	economic	recession	during	a	presidential	term,	in	the	beginning	of	the	presidential	term	in	particular,	the	initial	value	of	the	economic	indicator	are	relatively	lower,	so	there	would	be	more	room	for	economic	improvement	or	recovery.	Hence,	the	net	value	of	the	economic	indicators	during	the	time	period	would	likely	be	higher,	especially	in	the	long	term.	Moreover,	if	the	President	was	able	to	handle	the	recession	well,	his	or	her	economic	management	skills	would	likely	to	receive	better	ratings	in	the	rankings	conducted	by	the	historians.	Therefore,	Presidents,	whose	terms	had	economic	recessions,	are	more	likely	to	achieve	better	economic	performances.	Whenever	there	is	an	economic	recession	during	the	presidential	term,	that	presidential	term	is	coded	1.		
	 	
Great	Depression.		The	Great	Depression	was	the	worst	economic	downturn	that	the	United	States	had	ever	faced.	The	unemployment	rate	and	the	GDP	growth	were	among	the	worst	in	history.	For	instance,	the	unemployment	rate	had	a	462%	jump	between	1924	and		1928	(US	Bureau	of	the	Census	1975a).	Due	to	the	unprecedented	economic	depression,	the	President,	even	with	a	high	electoral	margin,	would	have	a	hard	time	achieving	a	good	economic	performance.	Also,	the	depression	lasted	for	more	than	one	presidential	term	and	the	recovery	process	was	even	longer.	As	the	problem	was	deep	rooted	for	a	long	time	and	was	exceptionally	complex,	the	Presidents’	economic	performance	would	likely	be	
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lowered.	Hence,	the	effect	of	the	Great	Depression	has	to	be	controlled.	Presidential	terms	during	the	Great	Depression	are	coded	1	and	all	other	presidential	terms	are	coded	0.		
National	Scandal	of	the	Executive	Branch.		Scandal	in	the	executive	branch	causes	negative	image	of	the	government.	In	the	meantime,	the	public’s	confidence	in	the	administration	will	decrease	and	weaken	the	power	that	the	presidential	mandate	carries.	The	opposition	within	the	President’s	affiliated	political	party	and	from	the	opposite	political	party	will	likely	increase.	Also,	the	public	checks	the	President	more	closely	due	to	greater	distrust	of	the	administration.	Hence,	Presidents	whose	administrations	are	affected	by	a	scandal	in	the	executive	branch	will	be	more	likely	to	face	obstacles	during	the	legislative	process,	have	less	control,	and	less	responsive	over	the	economy.	Ultimately,	poorer	economic	performance	will	follow.			 The	presidential	term	is	coded	1	if	any	of	the	events	occurred:	1)	criminal	conviction	of	senior	administration	official,	including	the	cabinet	secretaries;	2)	resignation	of	cabinet	secretaries	due	to	scandals;	3)	impeachment	of	the	President.	
	 	
Time.		The	political	system	and	culture	change	over	time	along	with	the	public’s	view	on	the	Presidents’	accountability.	Hence,	the	obstacles	that	the	Presidents	encounter	are	not	the	same	in	different	time	period	and	the	Presidents	have	different	incentives	to	develop	policies	to	impress	their	voters.	Moreover,	as	technology	advances,	public’s	access	to	information	is	much	easier	than	the	earlier	time	periods.	The	scandals	in	the	government	are	more	identifiable	and	spreading	in	a	more	rapid	pace	than	before.	This	is	one	of	the	
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examples	that	the	Presidents	did	not	have	to	encounter	as	much	as	the	Presidents	in	recent	decades.	Although,	it	is	not	entirely	clear	how	impactful	of	a	role	that	time	plays	while	I	would	be	analyzing	the	data,	including	time	as	a	confounding	variable	was	reasonable.		 Two	variables	are	created	to	control	the	economic	performance	of	three	different	time	periods.	For	the	first	time	variable,	the	time	period	covers	from	G.	Cleveland’s	second	term	until	F.	D.	Roosevelt’s	first	term,	are	coded	1,	and	the	rest	are	coded	0.	For	the	second	time	variable,	periods	from	F.	D.	Roosevelt’s	second	terms	to	Carter’s	presidential	term,	are	coded	1,	and	the	rest	are	coded	0.	The	set	up	of	this	confounding	variable	was	simply	by	dividing	up	the	time	period	that	the	study	covers	into	three	even	parts.		
Unified	Government.		
Presidents	and	the	co-partisan	Congress	should	be	expected	to	put	emphasis	on	and	highly	prioritize	developing	good	economic	policies	because	of	the	need	to	secure	reelection.	A	co-partisan	Congress	means	that	the	party	that	the	President	is	affiliated	with	controls	both	the	Senate	and	the	House	of	Representatives.	As	the	President	and	his	or	her	co-partisan	Congress	work	together,	with	a	high	margin	of	victory,	President	would	have	the	strongest	position	in	the	Congress	because	the	party	in	opposition	would	not	have	enough	votes	to	stop	any	bills	from	passing,	as	long	as	the	President’s	party	is	well-disciplined.	Under	this	condition,	I	expect	the	President	to	have	the	best	control	over	the	economy	and	have	the	best	economic	performance.	In	contrast,	if	the	margin	of	victory	is	low,	with	potentially	less	support	from	his	or	her	own	political	party,	the	President	will	be	likely	to	perform	less	well	in	terms	of	the	performance	of	the	economy.	The	President	is	
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expected	to	perform	less	effectively	and	encounter	more	opposition	when	the	Congress	is	controlled	by	another	party,	because	of	the	relatively	weaker	bargaining	power.	Presidential	terms	with	a	unified	government	are	coded	1.	
Voter	Turnout.		While	the	electoral	margin	shows	the	differences	of	the	preference	between	two	candidates,	it	cannot	demonstrate	how	many	people	have	empowered	the	government	with	their	votes.	If	the	candidate	wins	simply	because	he	or	she	is	the	“lesser	of	the	two	evils,”	the	legitimacy	of	the	government	and	the	presidential	mandates	that	the	candidate	carries	is	likely	to	be	lower	than	candidates	who	won	in	an	election	with	a	high	voter	turnout.	As	the	power	that	Presidents	derive	from	the	presidential	mandates	is	limited	by	the	voter	turnout,	they	would	potentially	face	more	opposition	in	the	Congress.	Thus,	the	effect	of	the	electoral	margin	would	be	offset	and	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents	would	be	hindered.	The	data	is	derived	from	The	American	Presidency	Project	and	I	used	the	percentage	turnout	of	Voting	Age	Population	to	represent	this	confounding	variable	(Peters	and	Wooley	2018).	
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Methodology			 Consistent	with	the	previous	research	on	the	electoral	margin,	several	Presidents	are	eliminated	from	the	study	(Potter	2013,	511).	I	excluded	the	Presidents	who	came	to	power	without	being	directly	elected	by	voters	(Truman’s	first	presidential	term,	Johnson’s	first	presidential	term,	Harding,	and	Ford)	because	they	did	not	have	measurable	electoral	margins.	Their	predecessors	were	the	ones	being	elected	instead	of	them.	Thus,	the	electoral	margins	that	the	predecessors	had	did	not	translate	to	presidential	mandates	as	I	had	theorized.	The	study	covers	the	period	from	1892	(Cleveland)	to	2016	(end	of	Obama’s	second	term).	Campbell	(2011)	suggested	that	Presidents’	economic	performance	have	lagging	effect	and	would	affect	the	successors’	performances.	In	order	to	address	the	lagging	effects	of	the	policies,	each	President’s	economic	performance	is	studied	three	times	with	respect	to	different	time	length:	1)	from	the	beginning	to	the	end	of	the	presidential	term;	2)	from	the	beginning	of	the	presidential	term	to	the	end	of	the	subsequent	term;	3)	from	the	beginning	of	the	presidential	term	to	the	end	of	the	second	subsequent	term.	For	instance,	Clinton’s	economic	performance	is	measured	in	the	following	three	periods:	1)	1993-1997;	2)	1993-2001;	3)	1993-2005.		 	I	tested	the	hypotheses	by	using	regression	models.		I	examined	the	correlation	between	the	electoral	margin	and	different	economic	indicators	with	respect	to	the	three	time	periods.		 H1.1.	The	data	set	is	taken	from	the	MeasuringWorth	Project	(Johnston	and	Williamson	2018).	The	real	GDP	growth	is	the	percentage	of	real	GDP	change	between	the	year	when	the	President	enters	the	office	and	the	first	year	of	the	next	presidential	term.	The	real	GDP	growth	of	the	second	time	period	would	be	the	percentage	of	real	GDP	change	
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between	the	year	that	the	President	enters	the	office	and	the	first	year	of	the	second	subsequent	presidential	term.	The	real	GDP	growth	of	the	third	period	would	be	the	percentage	change	between	the	year	when	the	President	enters	the	office	and	the	first	year	of	the	third	subsequent	presidential	term.	I	obtained	the	data	of	the	other	economic	indicators	with	the	same	approach.		 H1.2.	The	data	from	the	U.S.	Bureau	of	the	Census	(1975)	provides	the	unemployment	rate	of	the	United	States	from	1890	to	1947.	Next,	the	unemployment	rate	from	1948	to	2017	is	taken	from	the	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	(2018).	The	unemployment	rate	change	is	used	to	represent	unemployment	as	an	economic	indicator.	Similar	to	how	the	GDP	growth	is	calculated,	it	is	the	percentage	of	unemployment	rate	change	between	the	first	election	year	and	the	subsequent	election	year.	Since	the	data	sources	do	not	provide	the	unemployment	rate	of	an	exact	date	but	only	the	year,	I	need	not	concern	about	which	date	of	unemployment	rate	to	pick.		
	 H1.3.	My	data	of	the	value	of	the	US	consumer	bundle	is	derived	from	Officer	and	Wiliamson	(2018).	The	data	covers	the	value	of	the	US	consumer	bundle	from	1900	to	present.	I	measured	the	percentage	change	of	the	value	between	the	periods	that	I	am	studying.	The	value	is	taken	in	the	year	that	the	President	is	taking	over	the	office.		 H	1.4	This	hypothesis	is	further	divided	into	two	sub-hypothesis,	where	H1.4.1	would	be	using	the	growth	of	the	Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average	as	the	dependent	variable	and	H1.4.2	would	be	using	the	growth	of	the	Standard	&	Poor	Index	as	the	dependent	variable.	My	data	of	Standard	&	Poor	Index	(S&P)	and	the	Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average	(DIJA)	from	1892	to	present	are	derived	from	the	MeasuringWorth	Project	(Williamson	2018a;	Williamson	2018b).	For	the	S&P	Index,	the	data	is	recorded	as	the	average	for	
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January	of	each	year.	Therefore,	I	derived	the	value	of	the	S&P	value	at	the	year	when	the	Presidents	take	over	the	office.	For	example,	the	election	year	for	Obama	is	2008,	the	S&P	value	would	be	the	average	for	January	2009.	To	be	consistent	with	the	period	when	the	S&P	value	is	derived,	the	DIJA	value	that	I	use	is	taken	at	the	first	day	of	January	that	the	stock	market	operates.	I	measured	the	growth	rate	by	calculating	the	percentage	change	between	the	periods	that	I	am	trying	to	measure,	similar	to	the	calculation	for	the	GDP	growth.			 H.1.5.	Four	tests	were	being	conducted.	The	first	one	was	the	relative	economic	ranking	of	the	Presidents	created	by	Taylor	(2012).	I	ran	the	regression	against	the	electoral	margin	and	the	rankings	of	the	Presidents.	The	second,	third,	and	forth	regression	tests	were	using	the	C-Span’s	Presidential	Historian	Survey	(National	Cable	Satellite	Corporation	2017).	I	ran	regression	analysis	against	the	electoral	margin	and	the	rankings	of	the	Presidents	in	the	“economic	management”	section.			
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Results	and	Discussion			 Do	the	Presidents	have	better	economic	performances	if	they	receive	a	greater	electoral	margin?	The	results	suggest	that	the	answer	is	very	unlikely.	However,	from	the	results	of	the	analysis,	there	appeared	to	be	a	couple	of	cases	where	there	were	statistically	significant	results.	These	cases	are	open	to	debate	as	to	whether	there	are	merely	coincidences.	
	
Table	1			 Table	1	shows	the	regressions	for	the	economic	performance	of	the	President	within	the	presidential	term	that	is	from	the	January	that	the	President	takes	over	the	office	until	the	January	of	the	next	presidential	term.	This	set	of	regressions	is	designed	to	measure	the	immediate	effect	of	the	economic	policy	being	implemented.		 There	is	little	support	provided	for	hypothesis	H1.1,	as	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	was	statistically	insignificant.	As	can	be	seen	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	had	a	insignificant	and	weak	positive	correlation	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β	=.0815,	SE=.00515,	p>.10.	It	indicates	that	there	was	not	a	significant	relationship	between	the	electoral	margin	and	the	real	GDP	growth.	The	After	WWII	variable	had	a	weak	negative	relationship	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β=-.104,	SE=.137,	p<.10.	This	indicates	that	after	World	War	II,	the	real	GDP	growth	was	slower	than	before.	The	slow	down	of	real	GDP	growth	potentially	weakens	the	power	that	the	electoral	margin	carries,	followed	by	worse	economic	performances	of	the	President.	None	of	the	other	independent	variables	had	significant	correlation	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable.		
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Table 1: Economic Performance within the presidential term 
 H1.1 H1.2 H1.3 H1.4.1 H1.4.2 
 Real GDP Growth β/ (SE) 
Unemployment Rate 
Change 
β/ (SE) 
Consumer Bundle 
Values Growth 
β/ (SE) 
Stock Market Value 
Growth (DJIA) 
β/ (SE) 
Stock Market Value 
Growth (S&P) 
β/ (SE) 
Electoral Margin 0.0815 (.00515) 
-.00381 
(.0447) 
-.0777 
(.00407)+ 
.245 
(.0238)+ 
.152 
(.0219) 
Affiliated Party -.370 (.0718) 
.162 
(.524) 
-.325 
(.0569)+ 
-.0923 
(.279) 
-.0907 
(.256) 
After WWII -.104 (.137)+ 
-.202 
(1.19) 
.161 
(.102)+ 
.0712 
(.631) 
.201 
(.580) 
At War -.0690 (.0905) 
-.0913 
(.657) 
-.111 
(.0736) 
.0392 
(.349) 
.110 
(.321) 
Change of Affiliated 
Party 
-.00480 
(.0743) 
.134 
(.610) 
.371 
(.627)** 
.166 
(.324) 
.132 
(.298) 
Economy Status .261 (.0665) 
-.271 
(.578)* 
.222 
(.0557) 
.309 
(.307) 
.240 
(.282) 
Great Depression .0557 (.103) 
.337 
(.892)+ 
-.317 
(.0769)** 
-.0213 
(.474) 
-.143 
(.436) 
National Scandal  .0332 (.0947) 
-.217 
(.821) 
.107 
(.0981)* 
.116 
(.436) 
.134 
(.401) 
Time (F.D.R.’s second 
term - Carter) 
.363 
(.0880) 
-.159 
(.762) 
.305 
(.0668)+ 
-.151 
(.405) 
-.0528 
(.372) 
Time (Cleveland – 
F.D.R.’s first term) 
-.195 
(.141) 
313 
(1.21) 
-.302 
(.1103) 
.0343 
(.643) 
-.0954 
(.591) 
Unified Government .0639 (.0947) 
.0885 
(.729) 
-.120 
(.0703) 
-.0370 
(.388) 
-.0875 
(.356) 
Voter Turnout (in 
percentage) 
.108 
(.00520) 
.169 
(.0448) 
.000273 
(.00544)+ 
-.272 
(.0238) 
-.274 
(.0219) 
DF 13 14 11 14 14 
Adjusted R2 .193 .141 .624 -.0527 -.152 
(Notes: + < .10, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001) 	 From	the	second	column	of	Table	1,	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	had	an	insignificant	and	weak	negative	correlation	with	the	Unemployment	Rate	Change	variable,	
β=-.00381,	SE=.0447,	p>.10.	It	indicates	that	the	unemployment	rate	would	decrease	by	0.381%	during	the	presidential	term	if	the	President	had	one	percent	increase	in	the	electoral	margin.	This	was	consistent	with	H1.2	but	the	result	was	statistically	insignificant.	The	Economic	Recession	variable	was	negatively	correlated	with	the	Unemployment	Rate	Change	variable,	β=-.271,	SE=.578,	p<.05,	meaning	that	when	there	was	economic	recession	during	the	presidential	term,	the	unemployment	rate	would	drop	by	27.1%.	This	was	an	
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interesting	finding	and	matched	my	expectation	that	if	there	were	an	economic	recession	during	the	period,	the	President	should	have	better	economic	performance.	Whilst	having	an	economic	recession	decreases	the	unemployment	rate,	the	Great	Depression	variable	was	mildly	correlated	with	an	increase	of	unemployment	rate,	β=.337,	SE=.892,	p<.05.	It	means	that	the	presidential	terms	during	the	Great	Depression	had	33.7%	more	unemployment	rate	than	other	time	periods.	This	was	consistent	with	my	assumption	and	justified	that	the	presidential	terms	during	the	Great	Depression	should	be	controlled.	
	 From	the	third	column	of	Table	1,	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	was	negatively	correlated	with	the	Consumer	Bundle	Values	Growth	variable,	β=	-.0777,	SE=.00407,	p<.10.	The	results	indicated	that	one	percent	increase	in	the	electoral	margin	would	lead	to	a	7.77%	decrease	in	consumer	bundle	values	growth.	This	was	the	complete	opposite	of	H1.3,	wherein	I	expected	to	find	a	positive	relationship	between	the	two	variables.	Several	independent	variables	also	found	statistically	significant	results:	the	coefficient	on	the	Affiliated	Party	variable	was	negatively	correlated	with	the	Consumer	Bundle	Values	Growth	variable,	β=	-.325,	SE=.0569,	p<.10,	meaning	that	the	growth	of	the	consumer	bundle	values	during	the	Republican	presidential	terms	were	32.5%	lower	than	that	during	the	Democratic	Presidents’	presidential	terms.;	the	After	WWII	variable	had	a	weak	positive	correlation	with	the	dependent	variable,	β=	.161,	SE=.102,	p<.10.	This	indicated	that	the	growth	rate	was	16.1%	higher	after	WWII.	This	was	contradictory	to	the	real	GDP	growth	which	had	lower	values	after	WWII;	the	Change	of	Affiliated	Party	variable	was	mildly	correlated	with	the	dependent	variable,	β=.371,	SE=.627,	p<.01,	meaning	that	Presidents,	who	belonged	to	a	different	political	party	than	their	predecessors,	were	
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correlated	with	a	37.1%	higher	growth	of	the	consumer	bundle	values	than	those	who	belonged	to	the	same	political	party	as	their	predecessors.	This	was	consistent	with	my	assumption	where	I	predicted	that	the	power	of	the	presidential	mandates	brought	forth	by	the	electoral	margin	would	be	greater	in	these	circumstances	because	the	change	of	political	party	signified	voter’s	desire	to	change.		
	 Similar	to	the	results	from	H1.1,	presidential	terms	during	the	Great	Depression	had	worse	economic	performance	–	the	consumer	bundle	values	grew	31.7%	lower	during	the	Great	Depression,	β=	-.371,	SE=.0769,	p<.01.	Moreover,	the	coefficient	on	the	National	Scandal	variable	had	a	weak	correlation	with	the	Consumer	Bundle	Vales	Growth	variable,	
β=.107,	SE=.0981,	p<.05.	It	indicated	that	the	growth	of	consumer	bundle	values	during	the	presidential	terms	with	national	scandals	were	on	average	10.7%	higher	than	presidential	terms	without	national	scandals.	This	was	the	opposite	of	what	I	proposed	in	the	hypothesis	section.	The	coefficient	on	the	Time	(F.D.R’s	second	term	–	J.	Carter)	variable	was	positively	correlated	with	the	dependent	variable,	β=.305,	SE=.0668,	p<.05,	implying	that	the	growth	of	consumer	bundle	values	during	the	period	from	post-Great	Depression	to	the	Second	Cold	War	was	30.5%	higher.	Lastly,	the	coefficient	on	the	Voter	Turnout	variable	had	an	extremely	weak	correlation	with	the	Growth	of	the	Consumer	Bundle	Values	variable,	β=.000273,	SE=.00544,	p<.10.	One	percent	increase	in	voter	turnout	was	correlated	with	.273%	of	growth	in	consumer	bundle	values.	
	 There	is	strong	support	provided	for	hypothesis	H1.4.1,	as	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	was	statistically	significant.	According	to	column	four,	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	had	a	mild	correlation	with	the	Stock	Market	
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Value	Growth	(DIJA),	β=.245,	SE=.0238,	p<.10.	It	indicated	that	one	percent	increase	in	the	electoral	margin	was	correlated	with	a	24.5%	increase	in	growth	of	the	Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average	during	the	presidential	term.	None	of	the	other	independent	variables	had	statistically	significant	results.	
	 Although	there	was	statistically	significant	result	with	H1.4.1,	I	did	not	get	a	statistically	significant	result	on	H1.4.2.	Hence,	whether	the	electoral	margin	has	a	positive	impact	on	the	stock	market	performance	is	arguable.	The	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	had	a	weak	correlation	with	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(S&P),	β=.152,	SE=.0219,	p>.10,	meaning	that	one	percent	increase	of	the	electoral	margin	was	correlated	with	a	15.2%	increase	in	the	growth	of	the	Standard	and	Poor	Index.	Similar	to	H1.4.1,	none	of	the	other	independent	variables	had	any	statistically	significant	results.		
Table	2	
	 Table	2	shows	the	regression	analysis	results	of	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents	during	the	period	from	the	beginning	of	their	presidential	terms	to	the	end	of	the	subsequent	presidential	terms,	which	was	eight	years	in	length.	The	purpose	of	this	measurement	is	to	take	into	account	the	lagging	effect	of	the	economic	policy	that	extends	beyond	one	presidential	term.	
	 As	can	be	seen,	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	did	not	have	a	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β=.153,	SE=.00530,	p>.10.	It	meant	that	although	the	real	GDP	growth	appeared	to	increase	by	15.3%	for	each	percentage	increase	in	the	electoral	margin,	the	results	did	not	provide	convincing	
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evidence	to	support	the	correlation.	Hence,	H1.1	was	not	supported.	The	Affiliated	Party	variable	had	a	moderate	negative	correlation	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β=.490,	SE=.0920,	p<.01.	It	indicated	that	if	the	Presidents	belonged	to	the	Republican	Party,	the	real	GDP	growth	during	the	designated	time	period	was	49.0%	lower	than	that	of	the	Presidents	who	were	Democrats.	This	was	consistent	with	the	literature	that	I	had	discussed	above.	
Table 2: Economic Performance Between the Beginning of the Presidential Term and the End of the Subsequent 
Presidential Term 
 H1.1 H1.2 H1.3 H1.4.1 H1.4.2 
 
Real GDP Growth 
β/ (SE) 
Unemployment Rate 
Change 
β/ (SE) 
Consumer Bundle 
Values Growth 
β/ (SE) 
Stock Market Value 
Growth (DJIA) 
β/ (SE) 
Stock Market Value 
Growth (S&P) 
β/ (SE) 
Electoral Margin .153 (.00530) 
.182 
(.0342) 
-.269 
(.00844) 
-.181 
(.0310) 
-.220 
(.285) 
Affiliated Party -.490 (.0820)** 
.428 
(.476) * 
-.468 
(.124)+ 
-.0993 
(.432) 
-.105 
(.397) 
After WWII -.120 (.143) 
-.0841 
(.907) 
.123 
(.214) 
.485 
(.823) 
.578 
(.756)+ 
At War -.0695 (.110) 
.0596 
(.601) 
-.0256 
(.177) 
.0289 
(.545) 
.166 
(.501) 
Change of Affiliated 
Party 
.0847 
(.0805) 
-.0221 
(.493) 
.324 
(.140) 
.134 
(.448) 
.115 
(.411) 
Economy Status .203 (.0824)* 
-.148 
(.442)+ 
.0213 
(.143) 
-.0213 
(.401) 
-.0676 
(.368) 
Great Depression .550 (.105)** 
.0879 
(.6813) 
-.0786 
(.157) 
-.203 
(.618) 
-.301 
(.568) 
National Scandal -.0709 (.128) 
-.155 
(.6284) 
-.0687 
(.245) 
.381 
(.570) 
.351 
(.524) 
Time (F.D.R.’s second 
term - Carter) 
.308 
(.115) 
-.0945 
(.584) 
.501 
(.176) 
-.0757 
(.530) 
.0785 
(.487) 
Time (Cleveland – 
F.D.R.’s first term) 
-.132 
(.153) 
.260 
(.628)+ 
-.391 
(.244) 
-.383 
(.848) 
-.488 
(.779) 
Unified Government .0910 (.0986)+ 
0.00729 
(.628) 
-.0563 
(.146) 
-.232 
(.570) 
-.160 
(.524) 
Voter Turnout (in 
percentage) 
.201 
(.00531)** 
-.210 
(.0345)* 
.230 
(.0112)* 
-.208 
(.0313) 
-.159 
(.0287) 
DF 12 13 10 13 13 
Adjusted R2 .737 .367 .565 -.0841 .0798 
(Notes: + < .10, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001) The	coefficient	on	the	Economy	Status	variable	was	mildly	correlated	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β=.203,	SE=.0824,	p<.05,	indicating	that	if	there	was	economic	recession	
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during	the	presidential	term,	the	real	GDP	growth	is	20.3%	higher	than	average	within	the	designated	time	period.	This	result	coincided	with	the	prior	discussion	about	the	occurrence	of	economic	recession	within	the	presidential	term	was	correlated	with	the	unemployment	rate	change.	Furthermore,	the	presidential	terms	during	the	Great	Depression	variable	had	a	moderately	positive	relationship	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β=.550,	SE=.105,	p<.01.	The	results	demonstrated	that	presidential	terms	during	the	Great	Depression	were	correlated	with	55.0%	higher	real	GDP	growth	within	the	designated	time	period.	This	was	due	to	the	low	base	value	of	the	real	GDP	that	allowed	plenty	of	room	for	the	economy	to	recover	and	grow.	I	also	found	that	the	coefficient	on	the	Unified	Government	variable	was	positively	correlated	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	
β=.0910,	SE=.0986,	p<.10.	This	implied	that	presidential	terms	with	unified	government	were	correlated	with	a	9.10%	higher	real	GDP	growth	rate	than	average	during	the	designated	time	period.	The	finding	was	consistent	with	my	assumption	that	unified	government	should	lead	to	higher	real	GDP	growth	because	the	Presidents	would	face	further	less	opposition	in	the	Congress	and	hence	handle	the	economy	more	effectively.	Noticeably,	the	coefficient	on	the	Voter	Turnout	variable	was	positively	correlated	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β=.201,	SE=.00531,	p<.01.	It	meant	that	one	percent	increase	in	voter	turnout	is	correlated	with	20.1	percent	increase	of	the	real	GDP	growth	during	the	time	period.	
	 The	forth	column	of	Table	2	demonstrates	the	results	of	examining	the	Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average	growth	as	the	dependent	variable.	From	the	table,	H1.4	was	statistically	insignificant	because	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	did	not	have	a	
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statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(DIJA)	variable,	during	the	designated	time	period,	β=-.181,	SE=.0310,	p>.10.	In	the	meantime,	none	of	the	independent	variables	had	a	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(DIJA)	variable.	
	 The	results	from	column	five	reaffirmed	that	H1.4	was	statistically	insignificant	because	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	did	not	have	a	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(S&P)	variable,	β=-.220,	SE=.285,	p>.10.	By	combining	the	results	with	H1.4.1,	the	correlation	appeared	to	be	negative,	meaning	that	the	greater	the	margin,	the	worse	stock	market	performance	would	be.	This	was	quite	a	contrary	to	my	prediction.	From	column	five,	the	coefficient	on	the	After	WWII	variable	had	a	positive	correlation	with	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(S&P)	variable,	β=.578,	SE=.756,	p<.10.		It	demonstrated	that	the	after	WWII,	the	S&P	Index	had	57.8%	higher	growth	than	the	presidential	terms	before	WWII.	This	result	was	similar	to	H1.4.1	where	the	coefficient	on	the	After	WWII	variable	also	had	a	positive	correlation	with	the	Growth	of	the	DJIA	variable,	but	that	was	statistically	insignificant. 
Table	3		 Table	3	shows	the	results	of	the	statistical	analysis	examining	the	correlation	between	the	electoral	margin	and	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents	between	the	beginning	of	the	presidential	term	and	the	end	of	the	second	subsequent	presidential	term.	None	of	the	dependent	variables	appeared	to	have	any	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	electoral	margin.	
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	 As	can	be	seen	from	column	1,	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	had	a	positive	but	insignificant	correlation	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β=.186,	SE=.0123,	p>.10,	meaning	that	there	appeared	to	be	a	relationship	where	one	percent	increase	in	the	electoral	margin	was	correlated	with	18.6	percent	increase	of	the	real	GDP	growth.	Due	to	the	insignificance,	H1.1	was	not	being	supported.	All	independent	variables,	excepting	the	Great	Depression	variable,	did	not	have	statistically	significant	correlations	with	the	dependent	variables.	The	coefficient	on	the	Great	Depression	variable	was	positively		
Table 3: Economic Performance Between the Beginning of the Presidential Term and the End of the Second 
Subsequent Presidential Term 
 H1.1 H1.2 H1.3 H1.4.1 H1.4.2 
 
Real GDP Growth 
β/ (SE) 
Unemployment Rate 
Change 
β/ (SE) 
Consumer Bundle 
Values Growth 
β/ (SE) 
Stock Market Value 
Growth (DJIA) 
β/ (SE) 
Stock Market Value 
Growth (S&P) 
β/ (SE) 
Electoral Margin .186 (.0123) 
.0989 
(.355) 
-.0316 
(.0114) 
-.0874 
(.0578) 
-.184 
(.0520) 
Affiliated Party -.425 (.187) 
.294 
(.548) 
-.475 
(.166)+ 
.0304 
(.893) 
.0479 
(.804) 
After WWII -.187 (.326) 
.04342 
(.955) 
.0442 
(.286) 
.386 
(1.56) 
.494 
(1.40) 
At War .0363 (.286) 
.0693 
(.738) 
.147 
(.305) 
-.0699 
(1.20) 
.0343 
(1.08) 
Change of Affiliated 
Party 
.218 
(.195) 
.0439 
(.538) 
.254 
(.203) 
.00941 
(.877) 
.0208 
(.790) 
Economy Status .126 (.188) 
-.149 
(.551) 
.0549 
(.192) 
-.115 
(.898) 
-.192 
(.809) 
Great Depression .602 (.241)* 
.0161 
(.702) 
.134 
(.212) 
-.264 
(1.14) 
-.330 
(1.03) 
National Scandal -.192 (.280) 
-.0666 
(.815) 
-.214 
(.329) 
.455 
(1.33) 
.455 
(1.19) 
Time (F.D.R.’s second 
term - Carter) 
.149 
(.294) 
-.0544 
(.769) 
.0601 
(.263) 
-.112 
(1.25) 
.107 
(1.13) 
Time (Cleveland – 
F.D.R.’s first term) 
.0586 
(.371) 
.149 
(1.02)+ 
-.386 
(.341) 
-.315 
(1.67) 
-.446 
(1.50) 
Unified Government .207 (.249) 
-.0328 
(.659) 
.0884 
(.220) 
-.300 
(1.07) 
-.289 
(.967) 
Voter Turnout (in 
percentage) 
.0565 
(.0123) 
-.223 
(.0355)+ 
.289 
(.0150)+ 
-.323 
(.0578) 
-.304 
(.0521) 
DF 11 12 9 12 12 
Adjusted R2 .0952 -.00903 .598 -.3549 -.238 
(Notes: + < .10, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001. 
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correlated	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable,	β=.602,	SE=.241,	p>=<.05.	It	meant	that	presidential	terms	during	the	Great	Depression	were	correlated	with	a	60.2	percent	higher	real	GDP	growth	during	the	designated	time	period. 	 There	was	little	support	to	hypothesis	H1.2	as	there	was	no	statistically	significant	result.	The	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	was	positively	correlated	with	the	Unemployment	Rate	Change	variable,	β=.0989,	SE=.355,	however	p>.10.	This	was	a	different	result	from	what	I	hypothesized.		Interestingly,	although	the	result	was	insignificant,	the	coefficient	on	the	Affiliated	Party	variable	was	positively	correlation	with	the	Unemployment	Rate	Change	variable,	β=.294,	SE=.548,	p>.10.	It	meant	that	the	change	of	the	unemployment	rate	was	29.4	percent	higher	during	the	designated	time	period	when	the	Presidents	were	from	the	Republican	Party.	This	result	was	similar	to	the	correlation	between	the	Affiliated	Party	variable	and	the	Unemployment	Rate	Change	variable	in	Table	2	where	the	correlation	was	.428.	The	coefficient	on	the	Voter	Turnout	variable	was	negatively	correlated	with	the	Unemployment	Rate	Change	variable,	β=-.223,	SE=.0355,	p<.10.	It	meant	that	one	percent	increase	in	voter	turnout	was	correlated	with	22.3%	decrease	in	the	change	of	unemployment	rate	during	the	designated	time	period.	This	was	a	remarkable	correlation	and	provided	us	evidence	of	how	much	of	an	impact	could	voter	turnout	have	on	the	economy.		 The	examination	of	H1.3	did	not	obtain	a	statistically	significant	result.	The	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	had	a	weak	correlation	with	the	Consumer	Bundle	Values	Growth	variable,	β=-.0316,	SE=.0114,	p>.10.	Hence,	the	result	was	likely	to	happen	simply	due	to	coincidence.	Interestingly,	the	Affiliated	Party	variable	had	a	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Consumer	Bundle	Values	Growth	variable,	β=-
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.475,	SE=.166,	p<.10.	It	indicated	that	growth	of	the	consumer	bundle	values	brought	forth	by	the	Republican	Presidents	were	47.5%	lower	than	the	Democratic	Presidents.	This	corresponded	to	the	impact	of	the	Affiliated	Party	variable	on	the	consumer	bundle	values	listed	under	H1.3	in	Table	1	and	Table	2.	Moreover,	the	coefficient	on	the	Voter	Turnout	variable	had	a	significant	correlation	with	the	dependent	variable,	β=.289,	SE=.0150,	p<.10.	One	percent	increase	of	voter	turnout	was	correlated	to	a	28.9%	increase	in	consumer	bundle	values	during	the	designated	time	period.		This	result	was	also	corresponding	to	the	results	from	H1.3	in	Table	2.			 As	can	be	seen	from	the	forth	column,	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	was	negatively	correlated	with	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(DIJA)	variable,	β=-.0874,	SE=.0578,	p<.10.	However,	the	correlation	was	insignificant.	None	of	the	other	independent	variables	appeared	to	have	a	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(DIJA)	variable.	Noticeably,	presidential	terms	that	had	widespread	executive	branch	scandals	were	correlated	to	a	45.5%	growth	of	the	Dow	Jones	Industrial	Average,	β=.455,	SE=1.33,	p>.10.	However,	the	results	might	simply	be	resulted	from	coincidence.	No	any	other	independent	variables	had	statistically	significant	relationship	with	the	dependent	variable.	
Table	4	
	 Table	4	covers	the	regression	analysis	of	the	Electoral	margin	variable	and	the	rankings	of	the	Presidents	created	by	different	scholars.	The	objective	of	Table	4	is	to	study	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents,	from	a	historical	standpoint,	with	a	comparative	study.	The	Electoral	Margin	variable	did	not	appear	to	have	any	statistically	
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significant	correlation	with	the	rankings	that	were	created	based	off	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents.		
Table 4: Economic Performance from Historical Perspective 
 H1.5.1 H1.5.2 H1.5.3 H1.5.4 
 
C-Span Presidential Historian 
Survey 2000 
β/ (SE) 
C-Span Presidential Historian 
Survey 2009 
β/ (SE) 
C-Span Presidential Historian 
Survey 2017 
β/ (SE) 
Relative Economic Grade 
and Ranking 
β/ (SE) 
Electoral Margin -.0331 (.393) 
-.311 
(.387) 
-.235 
(.402) 
.114 
(.0391) 
Affiliated Party .395 (6.52)* 
.393 
(5.98)** 
.378 
(4.71)* 
-.411 
(.604)* 
After WWII .132 (10.7) 
.235 
(10.4) 
.105 
(10.7) 
-.0869 
(1.05) 
At War -.00319 (9.65) 
.190 
(8.06) 
.0280 
(5.90) 
.0398 
(.814) 
Change of Affiliated Party .0458 (6.78) 
.127 
(5.88) 
.106 
(5.48) 
.168 
(.593) 
Economy Status -.240 (6.18)* 
-.348 
(.602)* 
-.321 
(5.19)* 
.357 
(.608) 
Great Depression .0457 (7.59) 
.0454 
(7.67) 
.0914 
(8.01) 
.115 
(.774) 
National Scandal .117 (9.43)+ 
.277 
(8.90)+ 
.169 
(7.38) 
.0483 
(.898) 
Time (F.D.R.’s second 
term - Carter) 
-.1530 
(9.38) 
-.144 
(8.40) 
-.129 
(6.85) 
.235 
(.848) 
Time (Cleveland – F.D.R.’s 
first term) 
.0675 
(11.7) 
-.0964 
(11.2) 
.0244 
(10.9) 
-.134 
(1.13) 
Unified Government -.155 (7.89) 
-.158 
(7.20)+ 
-.0794 
(6.56) 
.0689 
(.727) 
Voter Turnout (in 
percentage) 
-.241 
(.391) 
-.262 
(.388) 
-.219 
(.403) 
.135 
(.0391) 
DF 10 12 14 12 
Adjusted R2 .241 .395 .248 .314 
(Notes: + < .10, *p< .05, **p< .01, ***p< .001.) 
 
 As	can	be	seen	from	the	table,	the	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	had	a	negative	correlation	with	the	C-Span	Presidential	Historian	Survey	2000	variable,	β=-.0331,	SE=.393,	p>.10.	It	meant	that	the	larger	the	electoral	margin,	the	better	the	Presidents	would	be	ranked.	The	negative	correlation	was	also	found	in	the	other	two	correlation	examinations	between	the	Electoral	margin	variable	and	the	C-Span	Presidential	Historian	Survey	2009	and	2017	variables.	Respectively,	the	results	were	β=-.311,	SE=.387,	p>.10	
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and	β=-.235,	SE=.402,	p>.10.	However,	the	correlations	were	statistically	insignificant.	Thus,	the	hypothesis	was	not	supported.		 Meanwhile,	there	were	several	independent	variables	that	were	worthwhile	to	discuss.	The	coefficient	on	the	Affiliated	Party	variable,	demonstrated	by	the	results	from	hypotheses	H1.5.1,	H1.5.2	and	H1.5.3,	had	significant	correlation	with	the	rankings,	β	ranging	from	.378	to	.395,	with	p-values	ranging	from	<.05	to	.<01.	The	correlation	indicated	that	the	Affiliated	Party	variable	was	positively	correlated	with	the	Presidents’	ranks.	Republican	Presidents	were	more	likely	to	be	ranked	lower	in	terms	of	their	economic	performances.	Hence,	Republican	Presidents	had	worse	economic	performances	than	the	Democratic	Presidents.			 Moreover,	the	results	showed	that	the	coefficient	on	the	Economy	Status	variable	had	mild	correlation	with	the	rankings,	β	ranging	from	-.240	to	-.348,	with	p-values	<.05.	This	was	an	interesting	correlation	because	it	meant	that	the	presidential	terms,	with	economic	recessions	in	between,	were	better	ranked	than	the	presidential	terms	without	economic	recessions.	The	reason	that	could	be	accountable	was	that	because	the	Presidents	were	able	to	overcome	the	economic	recessions,	they	were	better	ranked	by	the	historians	as	the	rankings	were	based	on	the	skills	of	economic	management.	Also,	coefficient	on	the	National	Scandal	variable	was	positively	correlated	with	rankings	in	2000	and	2009,	
β=.117	and	.277,	respectively.	The	p-value	was	lower	than	.10	for	both	cases.	The	positive	correlation	indicated	that	presidential	terms	with	scandals	were	ranked	relatively	lower	than	those	without	any	scandals.	Scandals	had	negative	impact	on	the	perception	of	the	historians	when	they	were	ranking	the	Presidents.	Thus,	even	though	the	rankings	were	
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based	on	Presidents’	economic	management,	they	could	be	indirectly	affected	by	the	negative	impression.		 Under	1.5.2,	the	coefficient	on	the	Unified	Government	variable	appeared	to	have	negative	correlation	with	the	C-Span	Presidential	Historian	Survey	2009	variable,	β=-.158,	SE=7.20,	p<.10,	meaning	that	presidential	terms	with	unified	governments	were	ranked	higher.	Therefore,	having	a	unified	government	appeared	to	correlate	with	better	economic	performances.	This	finding	corresponded	with	my	assumption	that	unified	government	enables	the	Presidents	to	have	better	economic	performances.		 The	coefficient	on	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	did	not	have	a	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Relative	Economic	Grade	and	Ranking	compiled	by	Taylor,	
β=.114,	SE=.0391,	p>.10.	However,	it	still	demonstrated	the	correlation	where	the	larger	the	electoral	margin,	the	better	the	grades	that	the	Presidents	were	assigned.	Nonetheless,	the	Affiliated	Party	variable	under	1.5.4	was	negatively	correlated	with	worst	grades	assigned,	β=-.411,	SE=.604,	p<.05.	It	reaffirmed	the	correlation	between	the	Republican	Presidents	and	relatively	poor	economic	performances	that	was	shown	by	the	observations	above.	
	
Discussion			 The	results	of	all	the	regression	analysis	demonstrated	that	the	electoral	margin	did	not	appear	to	have	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents.	I	did	not	obtain	results	that	could	support	my	hypotheses,	regardless	of	the	different	aspects	and	the	lagging	effect	that	I	had	accounted	for.	Although	when	I	measured	the	economic	performance	within	the	presidential	terms,	the	Electoral	Margin	variable	had	
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statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Consumer	Bundle	Values	Growth	variable	and	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(DIJA)	variable,	their	results	were	not	convincing	enough	because	their	level	of	significance	were	merely	at	the	border	line,	p<.10.	Moreover,	the	implications	of	the	two	cases	were	mixed,	while	the	coefficient	on	the	Consumer	Bundle	Values	Growth	variable	was	negatively	correlated	with	the	Electoral	Margin	variable,	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	(DIJA)	variable	was	positively	correlated	with	it.	The	opposite	directions	that	the	results	implied	could	not	support	the	hypotheses	that	were	made.		 An	interesting	trend	was	observed	from	the	tables,	even	though	the	results	were	not	convincing	enough	to	draw	a	concrete	conclusion.	From	Table	1,	the	coefficients	on	the	Stock	Market	Value	Growth	variables,	both	the	DIJA	and	the	S&P,	were	positively	correlated	with	the	electoral	margin	in	the	short	term.		However,	in	the	long	term,	from	Table	2	and	Table	3,	the	correlation	appeared	to	be	heading	the	opposite	direction	when	the	lagging	effect	of	the	economic	policy	was	taken	into	account.		Similar	trend	had	also	been	seen	from	the	examination	of	the	Unemployment	Rate	Change	variable.	From	Table	1,	the	Unemployment	Rate	Change	variable	was	negatively	correlated	with	the	Electoral	Margin	variable,	implying	that	the	higher	the	electoral	margin,	the	lower	unemployment	rate	would	be.	This	was	the	short-term	effect	of	the	electoral	margin.	From	Table	2	and	Table	3,	the	correlations	were	different	–	greater	electoral	margin	appeared	to	be	correlating	with	higher	unemployment	rate.	Both	the	growth	of	the	stock	market	and	the	change	of	the	unemployment	rate	were	indicating	that	the	electoral	margin	had	a	positive	effect	on	the	economy	in	the	short-term.	However,	in	the	long	term,	the	effect	turned	negative.	Contrarily,	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable	did	not	correlate	with	the	electoral	margin	the	same	way	as	the	other	two	dependent	variables.	Both	in	the	short	term	and	in	the	long	
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term,	the	electoral	margin	was	positively	correlated	with	the	real	GDP	growth.	Whilst	the	trends	were	both	statistically	insignificant,	they	were	remarkable	and	noteworthy.		 Though,	according	to	Table	4,	H1.5	was	not	statistically	significant,	the	correlation	should	still	be	discussed	here.	Table	4	provided	results	that	demonstrated	the	electoral	margin	was	correlated	with	higher	rankings	of	the	Presidents	in	terms	of	economic	management	from	the	historical	perspective.	Furthermore,	the	electoral	margin	appeared	to	positively	correlate	with	better	economic	grades	assigned	to	the	Presidents	based	on	their	economic	performances.	Overall,	taking	into	account	of	all	the	regression	analysis	results,	the	electoral	margin	had	a	mixed	relationship	with	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents,	both	in	the	long	term	and	short	term,	as	shown	by	different	economic	indicators	and	rankings.		 In	my	theory	section,	I	discussed	that	Presidents	with	unified	government	should	be	able	to	achieve	better	economic	performance	due	to	their	stronger	control	in	the	legislative	process.	There	was	little	evidence	to	support	my	assumption.	The	coefficients	on	the	Unified	Government	variable	only	had	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	Real	GDP	Growth	variable	in	Table	2	and	the	C-Span	Presidential	Historian	Survey	2009	in	Table	4.	Both	correlations	implied	that	Presidents	with	unified	governments	were	tied	to	better	economic	performances.	However,	the	coefficients	on	the	Unified	Government	variable	did	not	have	statistically	significant	relationship	with	the	other	economic	indicators.	Hence,	my	assumption	lacks	convincing	evidence.		 Two	independent	variables	appeared	to	have	significant	influence	on	the	economic	performances	of	the	Presidents.	The	first	one	was	the	Affiliated	Party	variable.	The	coefficients	on	the	Affiliated	Party	variable,	in	many	observations,	had	statistically	
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significant	correlation,	β	ranging	from	-.490	to	.395,	with	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents.	The	observations	were	uniformed	–	Republican	Presidents	had	relatively	poorer	economic	performances	compared	to	their	Democratic	counterparts.	The	strength	of	the	correlations	was	between	mild	and	moderate.	The	results	reaffirmed	Comiskey	and	Marsh’s	study	(2012).	The	second	independent	variable	was	the	Voter	Turnout	variable.	In	six	different	cases,	its	coefficients	had	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	economic	performances	of	the	Presidents,	β	ranging	from	-.223	to	.289,	uniformly	indicating	that	the	higher	the	voter	turnout	was,	the	better	economic	performances	of	the	Presidents	would	have.	This	reaffirmed	with	my	assumption	that	theoretically	speaking,	higher	voter	turnout	would	empower	the	President	with	greater	legitimacy	and	demonstrates	voters’	desire	for	change.			
Limitations			 As	pointed	out	in	the	hypothesis	section,	my	study	is	focusing	on	the	economic	outcome	resulted	from	the	impact	of	the	electoral	margin.	Therefore,	the	study	neglected	the	impact	of	the	processes	that	take	place	during	the	time	period,	from	the	President	takes	over	the	office	until	the	economic	status	is	being	evaluated.	Hence,	my	study	is	not	able	to	examine	whether	the	economic	outcome	is	simply	due	to	the	impact	of	the	electoral	margin	or	due	to	the	factors	that	the	President	is	not	able	to	control.	For	instance,	my	study	did	not	take	into	account	the	success	rate	of	the	President	in	the	legislative	process,	which	is	supposedly	a	key	factor	outlined	in	my	theory	–	a	greater	electoral	margin	should	provide	the	President	stronger	bargaining	power	and	more	support	from	the	members	of	Congress.	If	the	President	obtained	a	great	electoral	margin	and	a	great	economic	performance	but	
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did	not	have	a	high	success	rate	in	Congress,	his	economic	performance	might	be	resulted	from	factors	other	than	the	electoral	margin.	In	the	meantime,	that	circumstance	would	have	provided	a	misleading	result	to	the	study.		 			 Second,	Conley’s	(2001)	research	on	presidential	mandate	discussed	that	not	every	President	claimed	a	mandate	because	not	all	Presidents	asked	for	major	policy	changes.	For	example,	John	Kennedy,	Jimmy	Carter,	and	George	Bush	Sr.,	did	not	claim	any	mandates	(ibid,	XV).	My	research	did	not	take	into	account	of	whether	the	President	had	claimed	a	mandate	and	did	not	exclude	those	who	did	not	claim	a	mandate.	My	reasoning	is	that	since	Conley’s	research	only	covers	the	time	period	until	2000,	assessing	whether	the	Presidents	had	claimed	mandates	in	recent	years	would	add	complexity	to	the	project.	Moreover,	the	impact	of	the	electoral	margin	could	be	both	explicit	and	implicit	–	Presidents	do	not	necessarily	have	to	claim	a	mandate	to	obtain	support	resulted	from	the	electoral	margin.	The	members	of	Congress	could	perceive	the	public	support	to	the	Presidents	simply	by	looking	at	the	margin.	However,	my	study	would	not	be	able	to	examine	whether	claiming	the	mandates	would	be	necessary	for	the	electoral	margin	to	enable	the	Presidents	to	achieve	good	economic	performance.								
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Conclusion			 The	electoral	margin,	an	unit	that	signifies	the	size	of	the	victory	in	an	election	and	could	be	utilized	as	an	empowerment	to	the	Presidents,	has	not	been	studied	extensively	by	political	scientists	and	economists.	Whilst,	Potter	(2013)	found	that	the	electoral	margin	had	impact	on	the	foreign	policy	aspects	of	the	Presidents’	works,	I	was	interested	in	examining	the	relationship	between	the	electoral	margin	and	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents.	I	hypothesized	that	a	greater	electoral	margin	should	enable	the	President	to	have	better	control	and	timely	response	to	the	economy.	That	should	result	in	better	economic	performance	of	the	President.	Taking	into	account	both	the	short-term	and	long-term	effect	of	the	Presidents’	economic	policies,	as	well	studying	from	a	historical	perspective,	I	found	that	the	electoral	margin	did	not	have	a	statistically	significant	correlation	with	the	economic	performance	of	the	Presidents.	Though	statistically	insignificant,	the	electoral	margin	appeared	to	be	positively	correlated	with	the	growth	of	the	stock	market	and	better	unemployment	rate	in	the	short	run,	but	negatively	correlated	in	the	long	run.	Further	examination	could	be	conducted	to	study	the	matters	with	case	studies	to	learn	what	are	the	mechanisms	involved.	This	research	was	primarily	focusing	on	the	outcome	of	the	economic	performance	as	an	indicator	of	the	impact	of	the	electoral	margin.	Further	research	could	be	done	to	examine	whether	the	electoral	margin	truly	empowers	the	Presidents	during	the	legislative	processes,	such	as	leading	to	higher	success	rate	in	passing	legislations	regarding	the	economy,	and	their	responses	to	the	economy.	The	impact	of	the	voter	turnout	of	an	election	appeared	to	be	worthwhile	to	dive	into	as	results	had	shown	interesting	correlation	between	the	voter	turnout	and	the	economic	indicators.	
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